Introduction
The question of whether colours exist concerns the metaphysical status of perceptible qualities: whether colour is a mind-independent feature of the world or a mind-dependent one that arises only through interactions with perceivers. Although ordinary experience treats colours as straightforward properties of objects, this assumption can be challenged.
I examine three major theories of colour: naïve realism, which holds that colours are mind-independent, intrinsic properties of external objects; eliminativism, which denies the existence of colour altogether; and dispositionalism, which argues that colours are real, but constituted by the powers of objects to produce specific experiences in perceivers. I argue that dispositionalism offers the most plausible theory, as it preserves the reality of colour whilst explaining the systematic dependence of colour perception on viewing conditions.
Naïve Realism
Naïve realism — or primitivism — maintains that colours are genuine, mind-independent properties of physical objects. On this view, when one perceives an apple as red, one directly perceives a feature that exists in the world, regardless of whether other observers experience it. This view seems attractive because we ordinarily treat colours as surface features, much like shape or size.
However, this breaks down when we examine how colour perception varies across contexts. Colour appearance changes with lighting — an object that looks red in daylight may appear darker, washed out, or even a different hue under other lighting conditions. If colour were a fixed, intrinsic property of the object, such variation would be hard to accommodate. Furthermore, varied species perceive wavelengths differently. This undermines the idea that there is a non-arbitrary way of "correctly" seeing colour.
Objections to Naïve Realism
If this analysis is correct, colour cannot be a mind-independent quality of matter like solidity or shape. Instead, it depends on the perceptual capacities of observers and the conditions under which perception occurs. This challenges naïve realism, since colour experience results from the interaction between light, object, and perceiver rather than any intrinsic property of the object. Moreover, the systematic variation in colour appearance means the realist cannot simply privilege one "correct" viewing condition without justification.
Eliminativism
Eliminativism denies that colours are genuine properties of physical objects and instead proposes that colours are simple appearances generated by observers' perceptual faculties. This is rooted in early philosophy, notably in the work of Galileo. He argued that if "tastes, odours, colours and so on… reside in consciousness," and that if all living creatures were removed, such qualities "would be wiped away and annihilated" (Galilei, 2016). Colours, by contrast, arise only within the mind of the perceiver. Locke later developed this distinction through his theory of primary and secondary qualities, suggesting that colour is produced in us by the interaction of an object's primary qualities with our senses.
Objections to Eliminativism
Eliminativism faces a major objection: if colours are illusions, then ordinary perception would be systematically deceptive, and everyday observation would fail to represent the world accurately. This scepticism undermines confidence not only in colour but also in sensory reliability itself. This view is rendered unattractive, acceptable only if no alternative can explain the apparent reality of colour.
Dispositionalism
Dispositionalism offers a middle-ground between naïve realism and eliminativism. While it agrees that colour perception is mind-dependent, it rejects the conclusion that colours are therefore unreal. Instead, it treats colours as "dispositions" or "powers" of physical objects to produce certain experiences in suitably placed observers. To say an object is "red" is to say it has the capacity to generate red-type sensations under normal conditions.
This view has strong grounding in Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Locke argues that primary qualities — such as solidity or extension — exist in objects themselves and resemble what we perceive. Secondary qualities like colour, by contrast, do not resemble anything intrinsic to the object but are powers to produce sensations in observers (Locke, 1690/1975). Thus, colour does not disappear from the world but remains an efficacious, relational feature of physical matter.
A Critical Argument Against Dispositionalism
Despite the appeal of dispositionalism, there also exists the circularity objection. It is argued that the theory defines colour in tautological terms — to say an object is red because it is disposed to cause red sensations seems uninformative unless we already understand what a red sensation is. This suggests that dispositionalism is trivial, where colours are perceptual rather than objective, and raises the concern that it collapses into a form of subjectivism.
However, this can be challenged. Locke suggests that secondary qualities depend on "the constitution of bodies" that cause sensations in us, not on arbitrary standards regarding perception. Furthermore, while dispositionalism may appear circular, this can be avoided if "normal conditions" are defined empirically rather than conceptually (Logue, 2016). We can define "normal observers" as observers with functional visual faculties under standard illumination, without any presupposition about what a "correct" colour experience is.
My view is that the circularity objection gains validity only if we demand a reductive analysis of colour that excludes perceptual experience. Dispositionalism is better understood as a relational theory. If colour is inherently a relation between object and perceiver, referencing experience is a feature rather than a flaw.
Conclusion
The question of whether colours exist exposes a tension between appearance and interpretation. Naïve realism is intuitive but fails to explain perceptual variation, while eliminativism offers a scientific account yet undermines sensory reliability. Dispositionalism provides a balanced view: colours are powers of objects to evoke sensations, preserving their reality while acknowledging dependence on perception. Colour is neither fixed nor illusory but a relational feature linking the mind and world.
Bibliography
Galilei, G. (2016). The Assayer. In The Controversy on the Comets of 1618. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Locke, J. (1690/1975). An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Logue, H. (2016). "Metaphysics of Color 2: Non-Physicalist Theories of Color." Philosophy Compass 11(4): 220–231.